In this Court, the respondents have taken the same stand, and have also contended that the acquisition of these lands having been achieved by means of forging the signatures of Prahlad Rai, Gulraj Rai and Nawrang Rai, the present appellants are not entitled to a judgment on the application of the maxim, ex turpi causa non oritur actio. Both these grounds were accepted by the High Court.ģ. They also contended that after the termination of the lease of the appellants with the Bettiah Raj these lands were settled or deemed to be settled with them. The answering respondents, therefore, contended in the Court of First Instance that the predecessor of the appellants had caused these lands to be settled by the Bettiah Raj benami in their names to effectuate a fraud upon the Bettiah Raj, and the fraud having succeeded, the plaintiffs-appellants were not entitled to a judgment. They had stated that, according to the terms of the lease, ryoti lands taken in the names of the lessee or his relatives and servants were liable to be resumed by the Bettiah Raj after the termination of the lease, and that the benami transaction was entered into to avoid this contingency. In the plaint, the appellants had given their reasons for acquiring the property benami in the names of Prahlad Rai, Gulraj Rai and Nawrang Rai. They, however, raised before the High Court certain contentions found against them by the trial Judge. These findings were accepted by the present respondents in the High Court. He also held that the benamidars were related to Radhumal by marriage, and that Radhumal found it convenient to use their names. The trial Judge found that the consideration for the acquisition of these lands had proceeded from the predecessor of the plaintiffs, who had acquired them in the farzi names of Prahlad Rai, Gulraj Rai and Nawrang Rai. The suit was decreed by the Subordinate Judge, Motihari, on the ground that the defendants were in possession of the suit lands as benamidars. A claim for mesne profits and interest was also made. The suit was filed by the present appellants for a declaration of their title to 136 odd bighas of Ryoti-kasht lands and for possession thereof either exclusively or jointly with the defendants. By that judgment, the High Court reversed the decree of the Subordinate Judge of Motihari dated March 29, 1946.Ģ. In Henderson, the claimant was also convicted of manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility but argued that the reasoning in Gray did not apply or could be distinguished because Gray concerned a claimant with significant personal responsibility for their crime.Hidayatullah, J.- This appeal with a certificate granted by the High Court of Patna has been filed against its judgment and decree dated March 6, 1952. In Gray, the House of Lords held that the claimant’s claim was barred by the defence of illegality because the damages sought resulted from the sentence imposed by the criminal court and/or the claimant’s own criminal act of manslaughter. In Clunis, the Court of Appeal found that the claimant’s plea of diminished responsibility accepted that their mental responsibility was substantially impaired but did not remove liability for their criminal act and therefore they had to be taken to have known what they were doing and that it was wrong. The cases of Clunis and Gray involved claimants who were guilty of manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility. Claimant’s responsibility has been diminished but not removed However, the following guidelines should be considered. The precise ambit of the defence is uncertain. In practice, the defence is relatively unusual. This defence is commonly known as ‘ ex turpi causa non oritur actio’ which is usually shortened to ‘ex turpi causa’. If this question is answered in the affirmative, the defendant may have a complete defence to any claim brought against them. Was the claimant involved in an illegal activity?
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |